That is why Mark Harrison is “right and wrong”. To the question about comparing mobilizations of economies during the First and Second World wars
https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6304-2018-2-123-141
Abstract
The article analyses Mark Harrison scientific approaches to the estimation of military and economic potentials of the states which participated in the World wars. Accordingly, the authors apply a historical and economic analysis basing on the comparison of macroeconomic indicators, as in the works of M. Harrison. The aim of this paper is to reveal the relationship between the nature of the political system and a scale of the economy mobilization in conditions of World wars. The main point of the analysis is the question of the nature of the political system influence on the economy mobilization. The authors have come up with opinion that the political system affected the economy mobilization scale less than the economic circumstances. Often a central factor in increasing military production, as the author believes, was the loss of GDP incurred by a war. This article For the first time in historiography this article contains a critical approach to research results of M. Harrison. Scientists engaged in the economic history of the twentieth century and anyone interested in history may find this paper interesting.
About the Authors
O. Yu. KаzenkovRussian Federation
Oleg V. Kаzenkov
G. G. Popov
Russian Federation
Grigorii G. Popov, PhD in Economics
D. N. Ermakov
Russian Federation
Dmitrii N. Ermakov, Doctor in Economics, professor
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Review
For citations:
Kаzenkov O.Yu., Popov G.G., Ermakov D.N. That is why Mark Harrison is “right and wrong”. To the question about comparing mobilizations of economies during the First and Second World wars. RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Economics. Management. Law. 2018;(2):123-141. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.28995/2073-6304-2018-2-123-141